According to CMSgt Cari Kent, 30th Space Wing command chief, it is at basic training that Airmen learn everything they need to succeed in the Air Force.1 In recent incidents, Airmen have exhibited unacceptable actions. These range from transporting cruise missiles loaded with warheads from Minot to Barksdale AFB in 2007 and erroneously shipping nuclear-missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006, to other lesser-known infractions in the Air Force. Certainly, the remedy to such attitudes and behaviors could not be simply applying lessons learned at basic training. Or could the application of the basics taught to initial trainees have changed the course of some of these events? What do Airmen experience at basic training that leads the chief to this conclusion?...

The author’s examination of the counterair strategy process shows how joint force commanders should balance objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and policy limits to build a counterair strategy that links means to ends by choosing methods, targets, and attack timing.The author’s discussion of current counterair issues shows that the services appreciate the product (freedom of action for land, sea, and air forces) that control of the air provides, but neglect the process of obtaining it. Current air power disputes emphasize the control and targeting of air resources, and slight the potential impact of these issues on America’s future ability to control the air and space....

1 AIR SUPERIORITY AND JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 VISIONS AND DOCTRINE . . . . 5 Doctrine . . . . 6 Counterair Doctrine Evaluation . . . . . 8 Service Doctrine . . . . . 12 Joint Doctrine . . . . . 14 Conclusion . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 3 COUNTERAIR STRATEGY, TARGETS, AND TIMING . . . . . 19 The Counterair System . . . . 19 Basic Strategy Considerations . . . . 20 Strategic Choices . . . . . 22 Offense and Defense . . . . . 23 Targets . . . . 27 Strategy, Targets, and Timing . . . . 29 Measures of Success . . . . . 31 Conclusion . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . 32 4 COUNTERAIR FORCES . . . . 35 Capability and Cost . . . . 35 Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Weapons . . . . . 36 Manned and Unmanned Systems . . . . 37 Specialized and Multirole Forces . . . . 37 Weapons . . . . 38 Force Multipliers . . . . . 39 Conclusion . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 COUNTERAIR ISSUES . . . . 43 Roles and Missions . . . . 43 The Bottom Up Review . . . . 44 Controlling Joint Air Forces . . . . . 48 Fire Support Coordination . . . . 50 Theater Missile Defense . . . . . 52 Conclusion . . . . 53 No...

This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons....

INTRODUCTION....... vii Notes .......... xiv 1 DESERT STORM.....1 Notes..........9 2 PROLIFERATION.........11 Notes.........18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN.....21 Notes......... 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.........43 Notes.....63 5 CONCLUSIONS.....67 Notes .......72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.....73 Notes......... 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution........86 Notes......... 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research.....92 Notes........ 95 GLOSSARY..... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......101...

This study addresses three main questions to determine the transport bomber’s usefulness. The first is whether commanders can use such an aircraft in ways that truly enhance force application and mobility operations without unduly undermining one in favor of the other? The answer, because of technology enhancements and budget constraints, is definitely yes. The second question targets technology, specifically, by asking whether engineers could place some elements of both missions on a single aircraft? Again, the answer appears to be positive. This study analyzes budgetary and operational constraints in an attempt to answer the question of the appropriate force mix. ...

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . .3 2 OPERATIONAL UTILITY . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . 17 3 TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . 19 Notes . . . . .28 4 BUDGETARY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . .31 Notes . . . .41 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . .43 Notes . . . . .45...

In this paper, Lt Col Rex R. Kiziah, USAF, examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia. First, the author summarizes the US security strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region with emphasis on the importance of regional missile defense. Second, he characterizes the ballistic missile capabilities of North Korea and China, which constitute the primary threat in the region and have spurred increased US and allied pursuit of advanced TMD systems. Third, the author discusses the advantages, country-specific issues and status of cooperative US, Japanese, and South Korean TMD developmental activities. Finally, Colonel Kiziah details some of the complex regional security issues associated with US, Japanese, and South Korean missile defense activities vis-à-vis China and Taiwan; the challenges in ameliorating Chinese concerns; and the prospects of longterm partnering and fielding of a tri-country, integrated regional TMD system....

Dr. David R. Mets’s The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA—which is said to be afoot....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT WERE THE NOTIONS OF THE FIRST AIRPOWER ADVOCATES OF RMA? . . . . . . . .4 HOW DID RMA WORK OUT IN WARS FROM 1939 TO 1972?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 CHANGE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 WAR AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1990s: HAS THE LAST SANCTUARY BEEN CLOSED? . . . . .34 THE REMAINING HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . 47 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . .48 NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

This study analyzes how real-time battle damage assessment (BDA) might contribute to airpower strategy and execution. It provides a historical review of BDA during World War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War and examines the current BDA doctrine, capabilities, and procedures to illustrate contemporary strengths and shortcomings. This study identifies potential remedies to contemporary issues based on real-time BDA solutions by addressing technological, procedural, and organizational aspects. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of these possible remedies, with respect to airpower planning and execution, to identify viable solutions. This study assesses how alternative solutions might affect airpower strategy formation and execution by examining the improvements intelligence agencies and the services are likely to pursue over the near term and concludes with recommendations for the future....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT . . . . 3 3 BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TODAY . . . . . 15 4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPOWER . . . . . . 47 GLOSSARY . . . . 55...

This work examines the historical development of aerial precision since World War I and the emergence of the just-war tradition and international law since 1625. It then identifies specific dilemmas associated with the two sorts of judgments required by the just-war tradition, namely, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), and explores their ramifications. The aim of this study is to encourage moral and ethical reflection by politicians, strategists, and tacticians at all levels. The issues at hand are aerial precision doctrine, the use of the precision-guided munition as the modern aerial weapon of choice, and the influence of the just-war tradition on strategic and tactical decisions....

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Aerial-Precision Development: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 3 Airpower and the Just-War Tradition . . . . .33 4 The Dilemmas of Perfect Aerial Precision . 49 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...

The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...